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Andreas De Block
Freud as an
‘Evolutionary
Psychiatrist’ and the
Foundations of a
Freudian Philosophy
ABSTRACT: Freud’s philosophical anthropology is in
fact little more than an amplified psychiatry. For Freud,
the human being is in essence a sick animal. In this
paper, I discuss the possibility of founding this “an-
thropological turn” on evolutionary biology. On the
one hand, it is shown that Freud’s own attempted
“evolutionary psychiatry” failed because of his very
limited knowledge of Darwinism and his awe for
Haeckel and Lamarck. On the other hand, I argue
that more recent attempts to reconcile psychoanalysis
and evolutionary biology do not always provide a
solid biological foundation for the Freudian philo-
sophical project, despite the fact that they are—from
a Darwinian point of view—tenable. This is so be-
cause, generally speaking, these theories consider psy-
chopathologies either as adaptations or as accidental
disorders, and not as inevitable but dysfunctional
parts of human nature, like Freud did.
KEYWORDS: psychoanalysis, philosophical anthropolo-
gy, Darwinism, mental health
IN A RECENT ARTICLE on applied psychoanalysispublished in the International Journal of Psy-choanalysis, Aaron Esman writes that the
crisis of American psychoanalysis is largely due
to the fact that psychoanalysis is primarily con-
sidered as a clinical instrument, “rather than as a
basic discipline for the human sciences, an essen-
tial component of the study of mankind” (1998,
749). This seems a very provocative statement to
make in a psychoanalytic journal, but it is in fact
little more than a repetition of what Freud had
already written in 1933 in his New Introductory
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. In that book, Freud
claimed that psychoanalysis offered a reasonably
good therapy, but that it certainly had the best
prospects as a theory of human nature (Freud
1933, 156–57). At the same time, Freud remained
unclear on what this psychoanalytic theory of
human nature exactly is. What, in other words,
does Freud have to offer philosophy and, more
precisely, philosophical anthropology?
This question is difficult to answer; Freud’s
“discoveries” cover a wide range, from infantile
sexuality and the unconscious, to repression and
the psychic processes of condensation and dis-
placement. Despite this variety, we think that
there is only one underlying motive of Freud’s
research, which could also function as the cor-
nerstone of a “Freudian” philosophy. This un-
derlying motive is the intuition that there is no
substantial difference between the so-called nor-
mal human being and the mentally insane. In his
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first Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis
of 1917, Freud formulates this intuition very
clearly by stating that neurosis is one of the most
important “privileges” of human beings over oth-
er animals (Freud 1917, 414). On several occa-
sions, but most profoundly in his long-lost paper
on human phylogenesis, Freud also speculates on
how Homo sapiens acquired this “privilege.” By
doing so, Freud is clearly a predecessor of the
current evolutionary psychiatry. In this article I
evaluate Freud’s own evolutionary foundation
for his philosophy, and I examine the effect on
the core of this philosophy of more recent at-
tempts to reconcile psychoanalysis with Darwin-
ism. First, however, I sketch the outlines of Freud’s
philosophical project.
The Synthesis of Psychiatry
and Anthropology
According to Freud, clinical psychopathology
shows not only how an individual becomes men-
tally ill and functions as an ill individual, but
also how a human being “becomes” a human
being and functions as a human being. This means
that psychiatric categories are to a large extent
anthropological categories. In his opinion, all
constitutive elements of psychopathology can be
found in “healthy” individuals. But what are
these “pathogenic” elements, and to what degree
can they be found in every member of the human
population? It is this issue that I will try to solve
first.
Freud repeatedly mentions the remarkable sim-
ilarity of the normal and the pathological. In
“Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,” he writes
that the things his patients tell him are not differ-
ent from what he hears from healthy people
(Freud 1908, 146). In “Five Lectures on Psycho-
analysis”, Freud even calls it the most important
result of psychoanalytic research, to have discov-
ered that psychopathology is caused by the same
“complexes” with which healthy persons have to
contend (Freud 1910, 50). This seems to imply
that the common denominator of normality and
psychopathology has to do with the content of
representations. Both normal and insane people
deal with the same problems. It is no objection at
all that these problems are much enlarged in the
case of insanity. On the contrary, according to
Freud it is exactly this enlargement that makes
perverts, neurotics, and psychotics the ideal study-
objects for any (philosophical) psychology or
anthropology. In his New Introductory Lectures
on Psycho-Analysis he uses the metaphor of the
crystal to clarify this point:
we are familiar with the notion that pathology, by
making things larger and coarser, can draw our atten-
tion to normal conditions which would otherwise
have escaped us. Where it points to a breach or a rent,
there may normally be an articulation present. If we
throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks; but not into
haphazard pieces. It comes apart along its lines of
cleavage into fragments whose boundaries, though
they were invisible, were predetermined by the crys-
tal’s structure. Mental patients are split and broken
structures of the same kind. . . . They have turned
away from external reality, but for that very reason
they know more about internal, psychical reality and
can reveal a number of things to us that would other-
wise be inaccessible to us. (Freud 1933, 58–59)
Freud is very clear about the exact nature of the
pathogenic (and existential) problems: they are
all sexual, or at least rooted in infantile sexuality.
He even went so far as to reduce the fear of death
to “a more fundamental” fear of castration (Freud
1926, 129; Klein 1948/1997, 28). Nevertheless,
there is some variation in the pathogenic prob-
lems because of the fact—or psychoanalytic prop-
osition—that sexuality is very heterogeneous. It
even seems possible to ground a nosological tri-
partition on this variation. The tripartition im-
plies a strong connection (1) between neurosis
and the Oedipal instincts, (2) between perversion
and the pain of the castration or the sight of the
female genitals that can be found in masochism
and voyeurism, and (3) between psychosis and
autoeroticism or narcissism. Of course, it can
seem strange that Freud connected these perverse
tendencies with both pathologies and universal
existential problems. But probably, he only meant
that in neurosis, people wrestle first and fore-
most with love, in perversion with sex and vio-
lence, and in psychosis with identity and issues
related to identity, such as death and “the mean-
ing of life.” At least, such an interpretation can
explain why Freud—in some of his works—rec-
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ognized the importance of problems like aggres-
sion, love, and death for the human psyche and
human psychopathology (Freud 1919, 1927). He
nevertheless refused to modify the primacy of
sexuality in psychopathology.
However, Freud’s writings do not allow an
absolute tripartition, precisely because he “an-
thropologized” all these perversions. According
to Freud, (1) the Oedipal complex is the central
feature of infantile sexuality, (2) narcissism is
constitutive of every individual’s self-esteem, and
(3) a desire to see the female genitals is some-
thing (almost) every man experiences. Neverthe-
less, Freud sometimes holds to a fairly strict
causal relation between particular forms of psy-
chopathology and particular perverse impulses.
What joins both together is the infantile fixation,
because the fixation to a specific perverse in-
stinct predisposes to the pathogenic regression.
In this view, different pathologies correspond to
different points of fixation (Freud 1911b).
Of course, this presentation of the Freudian
nosology is highly incomplete. After all, the neu-
roses and neurotic symptoms are clearly more
than a reactivation of Oedipal wishes, just as
paranoia is not the same as manifest homosexu-
ality. The specific form of psychopathology is—
according to Freud—also the result of the an-
swer the individual gives to the return of the
infantile sexual instincts in puberty or adult-
hood. These answers are called defense mecha-
nisms, some of which are usually considered to
be pathology specific. There seems to be, for
example, a close connection between obsessional
neurosis and isolation and between paranoia and
projection. One may even suspect that the de-
fense mechanism is far more decisive for the
specific form of psychopathology than the infan-
tile instinct against which the defense mechanism
is acting. This is revealed, for instance, by the
fact that Freud attributes a central role to the
homosexual instinct in very different patholo-
gies. Whether an individual becomes paranoid,
hysterical, compulsive, or simply homosexual,
depends then ultimately on the manner in which
he defends himself against the threatening return
of the homosexual impulses in puberty.
Nevertheless, even on this point, Freud takes
what one may call an “anthropological turn”.
Projection is not the “exclusive right” of the
paranoid schizophrenic, just like the hysteric is
not the only one repressing. Freud connects so-
called normal human phenomena—like the reli-
gious belief in a supreme being and slips of the
tongue—with these pathogenic mechanisms. In
this way, the “psychopathology of everyday life”
does not differ structurally from the psychopa-
thology of the psychiatric hospital. Both are the
results of attempts to ward off a sexual instinct
or a sexual problem. Moreover, the fact that
everyone recognizes these phenomena, shows—
at least according to Freud—that the defense
mechanisms are not exclusive: we all feel ashamed
sometimes (reaction formation); we all make
Freudian slips (repression); from time to time,
we all blame others for things we are responsible
for ourselves (projection); and so on. Even with-
in the domain of psychiatric psychopathology
there is no one to one relationship of defense
mechanisms and psychopathology. In Freud’s de-
scription and explanation of Schreber’s paranoia
one can find such different mechanisms as elimi-
nation, repression, projection, rationalization, and
sublimation (Freud 1911a).
All this goes to show that the Freudian philos-
ophy of man presumes primarily that every hu-
man being has to react in some way or another to
sexual problems. In certain people, this leads to
severe psychopathology, whereas others are still
able to function more or less normally despite
the problems they are confronted with. That
means that the difference between normality and
psychopathology is only gradual, a conclusion
Freud arrived at in his “Five Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis” (Freud 1910, 50).
Now one may be tempted to see in this con-
clusion a complex reformulation—drain in aca-
demic jargon—of everyday truisms like “life is
hard” and “we are not born for happiness.”
Some could even underline the striking resem-
blance between Freud’s position and some theo-
logical doctrines, such as the doctrine of original
sin. And indeed, a religious inspiration may have
played an important role in the genesis of psy-
choanalytic theory (Webster 1995). This does
not mean, however, that Freud’s claim is just the
expression of a vague “existentialist” or “reli-
gious” feeling. At least, he does not deal with
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psychic illness and unhappiness in the same way.
According to him, illness is an inadequate reac-
tion to a problem that engenders in the body
(endocrinologically?), and that has something to
do with love, sex, violence, and death. Real nor-
mality would be an adequate reaction to such a
problem. Such normality is, of course, conceiv-
able, but unfortunately enough it is not within
reach of human beings. In short, when Freud
writes that there is only a gradual difference
between neurotics and normals, he does not mean
that normal people are non-neurotic, but only
that they suffer less under their neurosis.
Of course, this conclusion leaves several ques-
tions unanswered. One of the most fundamental
questions is certainly why human beings are so
extremely vulnerable to psychopathology. Or,
when formulated in a more Freudian terminolo-
gy: how did mankind acquire the instincts and
defense mechanisms, which cause so much seem-
ingly unnecessary suffering?
Founding the
Freudian Project
Since Freud’s time, different psychoanalytic
schools have emerged. Not all of these schools
adopted Freud’s project of a psychiatric anthro-
pology. Certain ego psychologists, for instance,
tend to concentrate on normality and sanity.
This does not immediately imply a betrayal of
the Freudian legacy, for a rather limited number
of Freudian notions—such as sublimation, the
genital instinct, and the destruction (or resolu-
tion) of the Oedipal complex—can certainly be
used to make a qualitative difference between
the normal and the pathological.1
Nevertheless, the majority of psychoanalysts
did—and still do—consider the whole of man-
kind as a psychiatric population. In Melanie
Klein’s work, this tendency is patently obvious.
She even pathologized the different infantile stages
by naming them after psychiatric taxa. In The
Psycho-Analysis of Children, she claims that this
intervention is based on the observation of chil-
dren and especially of infantile sexual activities.
However, there can be no doubt that this obser-
vation is extremely theory laden. An equally im-
portant objection is that Klein never addressed
the question why the baby—or toddler—brain
would be tormented by gruesome fantasies or—
in more Kleinian terms—by “the inner working
of the death instinct” (Klein 1948/1997, 29).
But Klein is no exception. Most psychoanalyt-
ic authors do not offer a theory that could found
the Freudian philosophical project. One of the
few exceptions to this rule is the French psycho-
analyst Jean Laplanche. He formulated a gener-
alized theory of seduction. In this theory, he tried
to reconcile the traumatic origin of psychopa-
thology with the universality of psychopatholo-
gy among humans. Laplanche achieved this rec-
onciliation by broadening the meaning of
seduction (trauma). According to him, it is im-
possible to escape seduction and the psychopa-
thology it brings about, because every child is
inevitably exposed to traumatizing scenes and
signs, originating in the world of the grown-ups.
These scenes and signs are seducing and trauma-
tizing, because they are all more or less enigmatic
for the child. These enigmatic scenes seduce the
child into a translation, which necessarily pro-
duces symptoms (Laplanche 1994).
Although this generalized seduction theory has
undeniable merits, it is in the first place a de-
scription of neurotic symptoms and symptom
formation and not a complete (integrative) or
even plausible etiological theory of a (general-
ized) psychopathology. This is largely because of
Laplanche’s untenable emphasis on the role of
trauma in pathogenesis and his strong rejection
of biology as a fruitful resource of psychoanalyt-
ic thinking. Moreover, Laplanche does not seem
to realize that the corroboration and foundation
of the Freudian philosophical project on nothing
but psychoanalytic findings is impracticable.
Moreover, as far as this crucial point is con-
cerned, Laplanche is diametrically opposed to
Freud himself, who was always eager to inte-
grate neuropsychological, endocrinological, and
particularly biological theories or speculations
into his own psychoanalytic metapsychology.
When it came to founding his psychiatric anthro-
pology, Freud even almost exclusively refers to
evolutionary biology. That means that Freud was
not only a biologist of the mind (Sulloway 1979)
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and as such a precursor of sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology, but also a biologist of
disease and in fact a pioneer of evolutionary
psychiatry.
Freud’s Evolutionary
Psychiatry
In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud de-
fines pathogenic sexuality as a dangerous mix of
infantile sexuality, puberty, lack of sexual peri-
odicity and a prominent role of menstruation in
the intersexual relations (Freud 1940, 153n1). In
his view, this combination as well as its patho-
genic effects are unique to Homo sapiens among
living species and might be the result of a dra-
matic change in the environment in which our
species evolved. In An Outline of Psycho-Analy-
sis, it remains obscure, however, what this dra-
matic change could have been and how this
change could have generated characteristics that
were passed on to the next generations. Fortu-
nately, Freud’s “A Phylogenetic Phantasy: Over-
view of the Transference Neuroses,” discovered
only in 1983, does enable us to make an in-depth
investigation of these issues.
Freud begins this article with a survey of those
elements he considered constitutive for psycho-
pathology, such as repression, sexuality, and re-
gression. He ends the short survey by examining
the importance of disposition in pathogenesis.
Freud equates the disposition with fixation, of
which he remarks that it has its origin in early
infantile impressions as well as in constitution.
On the one hand, this is nothing more than a
repetition of what he had already written in
“The Dynamics of Transference,” namely that
psychoanalytic theoreticians should accept the
principle of complementarity between nature and
nurture (Freud 1912, 99n2). Yet on the other
hand, there is a crucial difference between these
texts. In 1912, Freud ended the discussion by
postulating that psychoanalysis had nothing new
to say about the role of nature or constitution in
pathogenesis, whereas the last pages of “A Phy-
logenetic Phantasy” are precisely dedicated to
what Freud calls “imaginative” and “unverified,”
but nevertheless “stimulating” thoughts about
the evolutionary origins of psychopathology.
The starting point of Freud’s phylogenetic fan-
tasies is the environmental catastrophe mentioned
above, which Freud now specifies as the Ice Age.
During this dramatic epoch, it was necessary for
mankind to change its sexuality to such an ex-
tent that it now predisposes every member of our
species to psychopathology. In more contempo-
rary terms, human sexuality is an adaptation to
the environment of evolutionary adaptation (the
Ice Age), but for the environment we now live in,
it creates more problems than it solves. Freud
further applies this general idea to the different
transference neuroses. I summarize this applica-
tion:
1. The various dangers of the Ice Age compelled
the early hominids to abstain to a large degree
from sexual contact. The unused libido was
then transformed into general anxiety, which
was a rather helpful emotion in the threatening
environment mankind was confronted with. In
the anxiety hysteria (phobias) of young chil-
dren, this process is repeated: the child treats
his own unsatisfied sexuality as an external
danger.
2. As long as the Ice Age endured, there was a
chronic food shortage. This forced mankind to
decrease procreation. Perverse activities were
less problematic. Moreover, they offered a com-
pensation for the missed pleasures of genital
sexuality. In that way, a fixation to the pregeni-
tal libidinal stages was established. This fixa-
tion predisposes to conversion hysteria. Women
are more prone to this pathology because they
are far more threatened by the consequences of
genital sexuality, such as procreation and care
for children.
3. Whereas conversion hysteria is typical for wom-
en, men suffer more from obsessional neurosis.
The constitutional factor of this pathology de-
veloped when men partially replaced their geni-
tal interests by more intellectual interests, such
as language, magic, and law.
In obsessional neurosis, the shift in libidinal in-
vestment was to a large extent the product of the
primitive social environment and not only of the
Ice Age itself. The role of the sociocultural envi-
ronment becomes even more prominent in pro-
ducing the dispositions of the “narcissistic neu-
roses” (psychoses). Freud connects the major
psychotic disorders with the political and in-
trafamilial position of the father, and its effects
on his children:
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1. Only one man ruled the small hordes mankind
lived in: the father. Other men could only stay
in the horde if they were castrated. For the
castrated men, the castration implied stagna-
tion in personal development and—of course—
decline in libido. This condition is repeated in
dementia praecox (schizophrenia).
2. Some of the ruler’s sons managed to escape and
formed small groups of young men. In these
groups sociality was based on homosexual bonds
(homosexuality). Paranoia is the effect of a de-
fense against this homosexuality.
3. The members of the small groups sometimes
managed to kill the father figure and to become
rulers themselves. On the one hand, the take-
over of power produced euphoria, which re-
sembles mania. On the other hand, the killing
of the father also caused mourning, the normal
counterpart of melancholia.
Freud was aware of the fact that his evolu-
tionary psychiatry was problematic. He explicit-
ly mentioned two problems. First, Freud realized
that women suffer from psychoses as well as
men. In that way his evolutionary account of this
pathology fell short. Second, most of the events
that would have led to a psychotic disposition,
seem to exclude inheritance. Usually castrated
men and homosexuals do not have offspring.
However, Freud did not think that these were
fundamental objections. First of all, humans are
bisexual, which means that women can take over
dispositions acquired by men. And second, the
castration certainly made a great impression on
others who only witnessed it, and could in that
manner be passed through to the next genera-
tions.
Present-day evolutionary biologists would say
that Freud’s solutions are no less problematic
than the problems they are meant to answer.
Moreover, the Lamarckism pervading Freud’s
evolutionary scenario in “A Phylogenetic Phan-
tasy” is absolutely not a one-shot mistake.
Throughout several of his other writings, Freud
presupposes the heritability of experiences, too.
Although this might have been a common error
in Freud’s time, even among the best Darwinians
(Ritvo 1990), it does not alter the fact that Lama-
rckism and Lamarckian speculations are untena-
ble nowadays. Furthermore, one may find many
other evolutionary fallacies in Freud’s essay. Es-
pecially the strong emphasis on Haeckel’s bioge-
netic law (“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”)
is striking. Freud even went so far as to recon-
struct the chronology of the ancient geological
and sociocultural events on the basis of the point
in time neuroses appear in the life of the individ-
ual. According to him, for instance, the fact that
phobias manifest themselves very early in child-
hood implied that the evolutionary origins of
this pathology must be traced back to the very
beginning of the Ice Age.
These errors led most of the critics to the
conclusion that “Freud’s hypotheses will never
pass from the realm of the fantastic to the realm
of the real” (Parisi 1989, 487). “A Phylogenetic
Phantasy” was considered to be nothing more
than an interesting document for sociologists and
historians of science. This judgment is under-
standable and to a great extent plainly correct,
but it may have obscured the seminal core of the
essay and the undeniable need for an evolution-
ary underpinning of the Freudian philosophy.
This is the issue I deal with in the following
section.
More Than a “Phantasy”?
In Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud developed
an evolutionary account of religion that bears
strong resemblances to “A Phylogenetic Phanta-
sy.” There, he described the killing of the father
by the sons as the origin of social cohesion and
religious practice. In keeping with the idea that
human beings are “ill to the core,” this means
that both “normal” phenomena (religion and
social cohesion) should be seen as pathological
mixtures of obsessional neurosis, mania, and ho-
mosexuality. In fact, this idea returns in “Group
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921),
where he repeats the evolutionary argument from
Totem and Taboo. Apparently, Freud thought
that Darwinian thinking could safeguard the in-
trinsic relation between his clinical and his cul-
tural theories:
To be sure, this [the primal horde] is only a hypothe-
sis, like so many others with which archaeologists
endeavour to lighten the darkness of prehistoric
times—a ‘Just-So Story’, as it was amusingly called by
a not unkind English critic; but I think it is creditable
to such a hypothesis if it proves able to bring coher-
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ence and understanding into more and more new
regions. (Freud 1921, 122)
Today, many evolutionary psychiatrists em-
phasize the integrative power of Darwinism as
one of its most important strengths, just like
Freud did (Stevens and Price 1996; McGuire and
Troisi 1998). And there are more points of con-
tact. After all, some of the evolutionary hypothe-
ses in “A Phylogenetic Phantasy” can be main-
tained without much adjustment. For instance,
Freud’s suspicion that the sexuality of women
differs substantially from male sexuality because
of the higher costs she has to pay for genital
activities is not different from the underlying
idea in the work of Thornhill and Palmer (2000)
on rape or from the results of Buss’s (1989) study
on sex differences. Furthermore, the evolution-
ary link that Freud postulates between homosex-
uality and social behavior is echoed in the het-
erozygote-hypothesis of Sommer (Sommer 1990;
De Block and Adriaens 2004). Nevertheless, it is
clear that if psychoanalysis depended completely
on the evolutionary theory Freud defended in “A
Phylogenetic Phantasy,” psychoanalytic thinking
would be even more out of the scientific main-
stream than it already is.
Fortunately for psychoanalysis, several theo-
reticians such as John Bowlby, Christopher Bad-
cock, and Randolph Nesse, have shown that a
more reliable evolutionary foundation for psy-
choanalytic metapsychology is possible. Apart
from establishing a plausible account of the evo-
lutionary origins of several psychoanalytic key
concepts (defense mechanisms, infantile sexuali-
ty, the intense relation between the mother and
child), these authors also address the crucial is-
sue of “why we get sick” (Nesse and Williams
1995). In doing so, they have been paving the
way for a psychoanalytic psychiatry grounded in
evolutionary thinking and an evolutionary psy-
chiatry grounded in psychoanalytic thinking.
Moreover, one might expect that a welcome side-
effect of their approach is the biological founda-
tion of what I have called a “Freudian philoso-
phy.” However, this is not the case, because they
abstain from transforming the psychiatric ques-
tion “Why do we get sick?” into the Freudian
question “Why do we inevitably get sick?”
In their contribution to The Adapted Mind,
Lloyd and Nesse (1992, 603), for example, con-
nect repression with the capacity of self-decep-
tion, a capacity that “may offer a selective ad-
vantage by enhancing the ability to deceive
others.” Repression might also be adaptive be-
cause it suppresses socially unacceptable and at-
avistic wishes. This means that repression could
be a normal process. Repression is not the privi-
lege of psychiatric patients and severe neurotics,
although neurotics are of course repressing more
than the average person. Such a conclusion seems
to go a long way in bridging the gap between
traditional psychiatric thinking and the philo-
sophical kernel of Freudian theory. That the gap
is not entirely bridged is due to the fact that
Lloyd and Nesse focus on the adequacy of re-
pression (and other defense mechanisms), where-
as Freud insisted on the inadequacy of the de-
fenses. In Freud’s view, every repression produces
symptoms, and every defense mechanism pro-
duces more suffering than is strictly necessary. In
other words, the difference between Nesse’s view
and the kernel of Freud’s philosophical project is
that according to Nesse neurotics are people who
repress too much or repress inadequately, where-
as for Freud we all repress inadequately and too
much. For Freud, we are all neurotics. Nearly the
same reasons disqualify John Bowlby’s Darwini-
an psychoanalysis as a suitable foundation for
Freudian philosophy. In his description and the-
ory of the early relationship between mother and
child, Bowlby sets great store by the biological
(and evolutionary) aspects of this relationship.
He also emphasizes the vulnerable character of
the affective bond between the mother and the
child. It is, nevertheless, Bowlby’s strong convic-
tion that secure mother–child relationships and a
healthy development are possible (1990). Freud,
on the other hand, saw the relationship between
the mother and the child as an impossible rela-
tionship (reflected in the impossible relation be-
tween the analyst and the patient) in which both
were each other’s victim as well as the victim of
their own instincts.
In general, the problem seems to be that Bowl-
by and Nesse usually consider the psychopathol-
ogies as disorders, or cases in which something
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went wrong. This means that their concept of
psychopathology coincides with Wakefield’s def-
inition of disorder as “a harmful failure of inter-
nal mechanisms to perform their naturally select-
ed functions” (Wakefield 1999, 374). As such,
pathologies may still be suitable for understand-
ing normal behavior, but only insofar as they
show what happens in the absence of a normal
attachment or an adequate defense. Freud, on
the contrary, considers the different psychopathol-
ogies as unavoidable for the Homo sapiens. This
means that Freud’s theory leaves no room for a
specific etiology of psychopathology: human na-
ture “causes” psychopathology (Freud 1940,
195).
Now one may think that such a position is
diametrically opposed to the program of Dar-
winian psychology and philosophy; Freud seems
to claim that the human mind is unadapted in-
stead of being highly adapted. And indeed, an
evolutionary account of the Freudian philosophy
cannot simply employ the usual—and often crit-
icized—method of Darwinian psychology, that
is, contemplating a human trait such as a psychic
mechanism or a sexual preference, and then mak-
ing up a reconstruction that suggests the trait is
in fact adaptive (Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin
1984). But is there a genuinely Darwinian meth-
od that is more promising for a Freudian philos-
ophy? And can the Freudian philosophy inform
the research program of evolutionary psychia-
try?
Current evolutionary psychiatry connects the
different psychopathologies to natural (or sexu-
al) selection and adaptive value. However, the
relation between psychopathology and adapta-
tion can be very complex. Recent literature (im-
plicitly) proposes at least five different—but not
necessarily exclusive—evolutionary models of this
relation (Richters and Hinshaw 1999):
1. Some disorders (e.g., seasonal affective disor-
der) are themselves adaptations.
2. Some disorders are harmful dysfunctions of an
adaptation.
3. Some disorders (e.g., Alzheimer dementia) are
the effect of genes that have no effect before or
during the reproductive period.
4. Some disorders are little more than extreme
adaptations, due to the normal distribution of
adaptive traits and strategies in the human pop-
ulation.
5. Some disorders (e.g., phobia) were adaptive strat-
egies in the “environment of evolutionary adapt-
edness,” but are highly problematic in our new
environment.
This last model, known as the “genome-lag hy-
pothesis” (Stevens and Price 1996), was used by
Freud as well. He suggested that the disposition
for psychopathology might have originated in
the Ice Age, a period that was very different from
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Vienna, both
in climate and in sociocultural environment.2 Sec-
ond and more important, he connected psycho-
pathology with human traits that have, at first
glance, nothing to do with psychopathology. Ac-
cording to Freud, the major psychopathologies
were necessary side-effects of adaptive traits, such
as puberty and intensive parental care. And as
long as the advantages of these traits outrange
the disadvantages of the psychopathologies, hu-
mans will remain ill to the core.
This last “Freudian” model is a striking illus-
tration of the Darwinian truism that evolution
has fitted our minds and bodies for reproduction
and survival, not for happiness and health. As
such, it can be called a genuinely Darwinian
model. Nevertheless, this model is almost never
used in contemporary evolutionary psychiatry.
Some researchers do acknowledge the possibility
that psychopathology is a side-effect of an adap-
tive strategy or trait. Crow (1997) and Horrobin
(2001), for instance, consider schizophrenia to
be a side-effect of those adaptations that made us
human: language and creativity. But in the end, it
is only a small minority of mankind that is struck
by schizophrenia. Freud, on the other hand, held
that some psychopathologies (neuroses, psycho-
ses, and perversions) were necessary side-effects
of adaptive traits, and as such inevitable for each
of us.
Although this “Freudo–Darwinian” explana-
tory model can certainly not be applied to the
majority of psychopathologies, it might harbor
some interesting hypotheses for evolutionary psy-
chiatry. At least, it would make the research
program of evolutionary psychiatry richer and
more subtle, because it explains why the pres-
ence of a pathology in all of us does not necessar-
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ily mean that this pathology is adaptive. Of
course, it would be dangerous to illustrate this
Freudo–Darwinian model, because there are no
actual examples of such research. But it does not
seem too far-fetched to assume that the growing
realization of death during adolescence, which is
in itself a side-effect of an adaptive cognitive
mechanism, might cause serious neurotic prob-
lems in each of us. After all, our mortality is a
problem we cannot solve, but we might be in-
clined to try several strategies, such as hiding,
freezing, or inflation of the self (narcissism), that
have proven adaptive with regard to other, more
or less related problems.
Conclusion
Freud’s main advice to philosophers is to study
human existence first and foremost in terms of
its (psycho-)pathological variants. This advice
builds heavily on the conviction that there is a
quantitative, but not a structural, difference be-
tween psychiatric patients and so-called healthy
or normal individuals. According to Freud, all
human beings have—generally speaking—the
same problems and react to these problems in
the same—inadequate—way. Unlike many of the
later leading psychoanalysts (Klein, Laplanche),
Freud wanted to ground this philosophical project
in evolutionary biology. This is most clear from
the recently discovered article “A Phylogenetic
Phantasy.” Unfortunately, many of the evolu-
tionary principles Freud used in this article are
outdated or simply wrong. Recent theoreticians
have elaborated a far sounder evolutionary un-
derpinning of psychoanalytic thinking and psy-
choanalytic psychiatry. However, this “evolution-
ary psychiatry” is not the ideal foundation of a
Freudian philosophy; it does not consider psy-
chopathology as inevitable.
Of course, the value of a theory is not to be
judged primarily by the possibilities it harbors
for another theory. This means that the Darwin-
ian theories of Nesse, Bowlby, and others might
be correct, despite their problematic consequenc-
es for Freud’s philosophical project. We only
want to point out that (neo-)Darwinism does not
automatically exclude the possibility of an evolu-
tionary foundation of this Freudian project. Such
a foundation should differ from the classical Freu-
do–Darwinian synthesis in its emphasis on (cer-
tain) psychopathologies as necessary side-effects
of other, adaptive traits. What might be the exact
nature of these traits has yet to be investigated,
but Freud’s suggestion that it could have some-
thing to do with the prolonged childhood and
puberty of Homo sapiens is worth examining.
Notes
1. According to some theoreticians, sublimation is
an empty or a redundant concept (Levey 1939; Ricoeur
1965).
2. In fact, many evolutionary psychiatrists have a
comparable view on the etiology of psychopathology
and hence on the universality of psychopathology
among humans (Stevens and Price 1996; Charlton
2000).
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